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Greaney, Theresa M.—Measuring network effects on trade:  Are Japanese affiliates distinctive? 
 
This paper examines network effects on trade by comparing the trade patterns of foreign 
affiliates in the United States with the trade patterns of U.S.-owned firms.  The evidence strongly 
supports the following hypotheses:  1) foreign affiliates behave differently from U.S. firms in 
their trade patterns; 2) in particular, foreign affiliates display strong home biases in their trade 
patterns; and 3) among the foreign affiliates, Japanese affiliates demonstrate by far the strongest 
home bias in their trade patterns.  Controlling for income and distance effects, foreign affiliates 
from Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland traded on average 17 times 
more with their respective home countries and those from the United Kingdom traded 30 times 
more with the United Kingdom, while Japanese affiliates traded a whopping 130 times more 
with Japan.   
JEL classification:  F14; F23 
Keywords:  Network effects; Foreign affiliates; Trade patterns 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.  Introduction 
In recent years, economists have begun to describe and quantify the impacts of business 
and social networks on international trade.  In an international environment where contracts are 
not always enforceable and product information is imperfect, relationships between buyers and 
sellers matter.  In some countries and cultures, they seem to matter more than in others.  While 
examples of such relationships or networks can be found throughout history (e.g., the 11
th 
century Maghribi traders studied by Greif, 1993), most economists have focused on networks 
that impact trade today.  Japanese keiretsu and overseas Chinese networks are often cited as 
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contemporary examples of networks that may affect international trade, but empirical work 
measuring network effects is still limited.  
Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), and Rauch and Trindade (2002) demonstrate the 
importance of network effects by examining the influence of immigrants on international trade.  
They find that immigrants have a statistically significant positive effect on bilateral trade 
between their countries of emigration and immigration.  Rauch and Trindade specifically 
examine the trade effects of ethnic Chinese networks, as proxied by the product of ethnic 
Chinese population shares.  They find that these networks increased bilateral trade both within 
Southeast Asia and for other country pairs.   
Although many observers assert the importance of Japanese keiretsu for international 
trade, empirical work has focused almost exclusively on the potential for keiretsu to depress 
Japanese imports.  Fung (1991) and Lawrence (1991) both find that the extent of horizontal and 
vertical keiretsu presence in an industry is negatively correlated with import penetration.
1  At the 
firm level, however, Ueda and Sasaki (1998) report that keiretsu firms import at least as much as 
non-keiretsu firms.  Focusing on auto parts trade, Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) find that U.S. 
exports to Japan are lower for parts where vertical keiretsu are prominent in Japan.  These papers 
leave open the question of how Japanese keiretsu might affect world trade beyond Japan’s 
importing.  Perhaps as importantly, none of them considers the possibility that Japanese business 
networks could extend beyond traditional keiretsu linkages. 
This paper addresses both of these questions and compares the trade impacts of Japanese 
business groups to those of several other industrialized countries.  Targeting all of these 
objectives involves some necessary tradeoffs.  Rather than trying to cover world trade, I limit my 
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attention to U.S. trade flows.  I examine how networks, particularly Japanese networks, affect 
U.S. trade by comparing the trade patterns of foreign affiliates in the United States with those of 
U.S.-owned firms.  I address the following research questions:  Do foreign affiliates behave 
differently from U.S. firms in their trade patterns?  Among affiliates, do network effects have a 
significant impact on trade?  Has the strength of network effects changed over time?  Do 
Japanese affiliates behave differently than the affiliates of other countries in terms of their trade 
pattern?  Do Japanese affiliates appear to have particularly strong networks, and has the strength 
of these networks changed over time?  What are the implications for trade and trade policy? 
Theoretical work that links network effects to international trade includes Greif (1993), 
Rauch (1996), McLaren (1999), Kranton and Minehart (2001), Casella and Rauch (2002) and 
Greaney (2003).  In Greaney (2003), network effects are modeled as a cost advantage in selling 
to buyers from the producer’s own country.  Asymmetry across countries in the strength of this 
network effect results in lower inward foreign direct investment (FDI), lower total imports but 
larger volumes of reverse imports
2 into the country with strong network effects (e.g., Japan).  
The model’s predictions match observed asymmetric trade and investment flows that sometimes 
lead to U.S.-Japan trade friction. 
This paper is an empirical complement to Greaney (2003) but does not limit its focus to 
Japanese networks alone.  Here I measure the strength of network effects on the trade of eight 
industrialized countries’ foreign affiliates operating in the United States.  Network effects are 
estimated by examining the extent of affiliates’ home bias in their exporting and importing 
activities, while controlling for income and distance effects.  I find that the affiliates on average 
display strong home bias in their trade activities, and that Japanese affiliates display by far the 
highest level of home bias.    3
2.  Data details 
Other papers on network effects on trade have developed proxy measures of cross-border 
networks using immigration flows (Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998)), population shares 
(Rauch and Trindade (2002)) or colonial ties and distance (Rauch (1999)).  I use a more direct 
measure of network effects by disaggregating U.S. trade with eight trade partners into trade by 
American-owned firms versus trade by foreign affiliates located in the United States.
3  Networks 
between affiliates and suppliers or buyers in their home countries would tend to create a home 
bias in their trade patterns. 
For affiliates’ trade data, I use the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ survey Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States, which is conducted every five years.  The most recent survey 
results available are for 1987, 1992 and 1997.  The published survey results identify bilateral 
trade by affiliates’ country of ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) for only eight countries— 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom.  This allows for comparison of the trade pattern of Japanese affiliates to that of seven 
other industrialized countries’ affiliates in the United States.  For U.S. bilateral trade data, I use 
Statistics Canada’s World Trade Analyzer.  For the gravity model estimations, the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics provided GDP data and the “empirical investigations in 
international trade” website (formerly maintained by Jon Haveman, Ph.D.) provided kilometer 
distances between capitol cities. 
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3.  Activities of foreign affiliates   
Tables 1 and 2 show summary statistics on the activities of foreign affiliates by country 
of ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) in 1987 and 1997.
4  Since bilateral trade data for subsequent 
tables are available for only eight specific countries’ affiliates, I focus on these countries along 
with presenting some regional totals in these tables.  Japan stands out as early as 1987 for having 
the highest number of affiliates and these affiliates had the largest total assets, expenditures for 
property, plant and equipment, sales, and by far the highest level of participation in exporting 
and importing of any of the countries’ affiliates.  By 1997, Japanese affiliates maintained their 
lead in all of these categories and had surpassed Canadian and British affiliates in the number of 
companies consolidated and in gross property, plant and equipment.  Again, the strongest 
difference between the Japanese affiliates and their other foreign counterparts is the much larger 
volume of exports and imports generated by the Japanese affiliates—$52.5 billion in exports and 
$120.7 billion in imports versus the next highest trade figures of $14.5 billion in exports for U.K. 
affiliates and $15.3 billion in imports for Canadian affiliates.  This large gap might be explained 
by a preponderance of Japanese affiliates involved explicitly in trade activities (i.e., trading 
companies).  To investigate this possibility, I next examine evidence on the importing and 
exporting patterns of the affiliates by industry.   
Tables 3-6 help to clarify the reasons for the high level of trade conducted by Japanese 
affiliates.  Tables 3 and 4 show U.S. imports of goods shipped to affiliates by industry in 1987 
and 1997.  In 1987, $68.2 billion or 93.9% of the imports of Japanese affiliates were shipped to 
affiliates involved in wholesale trade, particularly those engaged in motor vehicles and 
equipment trade (45.5%).  Only German affiliates appeared similar in having a large share of 
their imports (71.5% or $12.3 billion) going to affiliates in wholesale trade, particularly to those  5
in autos and auto parts trade (53.9%).  In contrast, only 5.8% ($4.2 billion) of Japanese affiliates’ 
imports went to manufacturing affiliates, while 25.0% (German) to 60.3% (Australian) of the 
other eight countries’ affiliates went to manufacturing affiliates in 1987.  By 1997, the dominant 
importing role of Japanese wholesale trade affiliates had lessened somewhat, to 68.2% ($82.3 
billion) of imports, with only 24.7% for autos and auto parts affiliates, while importing by 
manufacturing affiliates rose to 31.1% of the total. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the pattern of exporting across industries by different countries’ 
affiliates in 1987 and 1997.  The trend seen in the importing activities of Japanese affiliates is 
repeated in their exporting activities.  In 1987, Japanese affiliates in wholesale trade accounted 
for almost all exporting by Japanese affiliates ($19.2 billion of $20.4 billion, or 94.1%), while 
manufacturing affiliates accounted for only 5.5%.  Wholesale trade affiliates in metals and 
minerals accounted for $10.2 billion or 50.0% of all exports, while farm-product raw materials 
affiliates added another 20.3%.  In 1997, the export activities of Japanese wholesale trade 
affiliates were up to $35.1 billion but this represented only 66.7% of total exports.  Japanese 
manufacturing affiliates exported $16.5 billion or 31.4% of the total. 
To examine how important foreign affiliates’ trade activities are relative to U.S. total 
trade, I disaggregate bilateral trade into affiliates’ trade and U.S. firms’ trade in Table 7.  By far, 
foreign affiliates play the largest role in U.S. trade with Japan.  In 1987, affiliates accounted for 
61.6% of U.S. exports to Japan and 78.2% of U.S. imports from Japan, while the comparable 
figures for affiliates’ share of total U.S. trade were 17.4% and 34.4%, respectively.  In 1997, 
affiliates’ share of U.S. exports to Japan was a much lower 47.4% while their import share from 
Japan was slightly higher at 82.7%.  The shares for affiliates’ in U.S. total trade were 19.2% and 
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29.6%, respectively.  Next to Japan, foreign affiliates played the largest role in U.S. imports from 
Germany (52.6%) and Switzerland (62.6%) in 1997.   
The dominant role that foreign affiliates played in U.S. trade with Japan remains the 
largest outlier in Table 7.  To connect these figures to the potential role of Japanese trading 
companies and/or intra-firm trade by Japanese multinationals, I need to identify what portion of 
U.S. trade with Japan is generated by Japanese affiliates in the United States, rather than by all 
foreign affiliates, as in Table 7.  The first two columns of Table 8 answer this question.  Japanese 
affiliates exported 51.2% of total U.S. exports to Japan in 1987 and 38.5% in 1997, much higher 
percentages than the 0.5% to 13.7% range for the selected other countries’ affiliates.  In 
importing, foreign affiliates accounted for even larger shares of bilateral trade with their 
individual home countries and Japanese affiliates again accounted for the largest shares.   
Japanese affiliates were responsible for 76.3% and 80.7% of U.S. imports from Japan in 1987 
and 1997, while the next highest levels of affiliate control of importing from their home 
countries were the 51.5% and 47.0% figures attributed to German affiliates in 1987 and 1997.    
By changing the denominator, the next two columns of Table 8 show the degree of home 
bias in the exporting and importing activities of the foreign affiliates.  In 1987, Japanese 
affiliates had by far the highest degree of home bias in their exporting, at 77.3%.  The next 
highest degree of home bias in exporting was only 30.7% for Canadian affiliates.  In 1997, 
Japanese affiliates’ home bias in exporting fell to 51.8%, just below the 52.3% posted by 
Canadian affiliates.  Japanese affiliates had an extremely high degree of home bias in importing 
in 1987, 93.1%, although this was not too much higher than the home bias shown by West 
German affiliates (82.5%) and Canadian affiliates (73.4%).  The home bias of Japanese affiliates  7
in importing fell to 81.1% in 1997, below that of Canadian affiliates (85.6%) but the Canadian 
affiliates face much lower transportation costs in importing from home.   
The next two columns of Table 8 compare the home bias of affiliates with the trade 
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where 
i
k X  are the exports from (imports to) country k affiliates to (from) country i and 
i
US X  are 
the exports from (imports to) U.S. firms to (from) country i.  The numerator represents the home 
bias of affiliates from country k.  The denominator represents the tendency of U.S. firms to trade 
with country k among all other trade partners.  
Any degree of network effects would tend to raise these ratios to levels above one, 
indicating that on average foreign affiliates have a greater tendency to trade with their particular 
home country than does a U.S. firm.  Higher ratios indicate even larger divergences between the 
trading behavior of the foreign affiliates and the U.S. firms.  In terms of exporting in 1987, 
Japanese and Swiss affiliates had the highest home bias divergence from U.S. firms’ export 
pattern, with ratios of 14.9 and 15.2, respectively.  The decline in Japanese affiliates’ export 
home bias in 1997 is reflected in a lower ratio of 8.3, meaning Japanese affiliates on average 
favor Japan over other export destinations 8 times more than do U.S. firms on average.  That 
year, Australian and Swiss affiliates posted higher ratios of 9.95 and 19.4, respectively.  In 
importing, although Japanese affiliates displayed very high levels of home bias in importing in 
1987 and 1997, their tendency to buy from Japan did not diverge as much from U.S. firms’ 
importing patterns as did the home bias displayed by several other countries’ affiliates.  Five of 
the other seven countries’ affiliates had higher ratios than Japan’s 13.2 in 1987, and three had  8
higher ratios than Japan’s 24.3 in 1997.  Overall, the statistics in these two columns of Table 8 
indicate tremendous divergence between the trade pattern of U.S. firms and that of foreign 
affiliates with respect to their home countries.  This provides suggestive evidence of the strength 
of network effects in the activities of foreign affiliates in the United States. 
The final two columns of Table 8 focus specifically on intra-group trade tendencies of 
affiliates, without regard to whether the other group firms are located in the home country or 
elsewhere.  Japanese affiliates appear to have a somewhat higher intra-group export bias of 
53.2% and 60.6% in 1987 and 1997 than do Canadian or European affiliates, which averaged 
between 17% and 50%.  Japanese affiliates showed an even stronger preference for purchasing 
imports from within their corporate groups, 79.0% in 1987 and 79.7% in 1997.  However, 
several of the other countries’ affiliates showed even stronger intra-group biases in importing—
West German (86.9%) affiliates in 1987, and Canadian (85.4%), German (80.7%) and Swiss 
(80.9) affiliates in 1997. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics provide evidence that foreign affiliates have strong 
biases towards trade with their home countries.  This evidence is consistent with a hypothesis 
that national business networks matter for international trade.  The descriptive evidence is more 
mixed regarding the particular strength of Japanese networks.  Japanese affiliates have much 
higher home biases in their exporting and importing activities than do most European affiliates.  
The high home biases in the trade activities of Japanese affiliates are matched only by Canadian 
affiliates, whose home trade biases are supported by low transportation costs.  However, in 
comparing the trade patterns of the foreign affiliates to those of U.S.-owned firms, Japanese 
affiliates are not such outliers.  Australian and a few European affiliates showed greater 
divergence in their trade patterns relative to U.S. firms than did Japanese affiliates.   9
4.  Gravity model estimates of network effects 
To further explore the role of networks in international trade, I adopt a gravity model to 
examine the determinants of U.S. bilateral trade involving foreign affiliates in the United States.  
For my gravity estimation, I adapt Feenstra’s (2002) gravity equation to meet the needs of my 
data.  Feenstra (2002) uses the following basic equation: 
( )
ij i i ij j i ij dist Y Y X ε δ β δ β α + + + = 2 2 1 1 ) 1 ln( ln                  (2) 
where 
ij X  represents exports from country i to country j, 
i Y  and 
j Y  represent the GDP’s of 
countries i and j,  1
ij dist  is the distance between the two trading countries, and  1
i δ  and  2
i δ  are the 
source and destination dummy variables for country i.  The country fixed effects are included to 
account for unobserved price indices for the countries. 
The gravity equation in (2) typically is used to estimate bilateral trade for many different 
trade partners.  Since I will be using survey data on foreign affiliates in the United States, my 
estimates of bilateral trade involve the United States as either the source or destination country 
for each observation.  There is no particular advantage in normalizing all observations of the 
dependent variable by U.S. GDP, so I change the dependent variable to the natural log of 
bilateral trade divided by the non-U.S. source or destination country GDP (i.e.,  ( )
US non ij Y X
− ln ).  
I also change
ij X  to 
ij
k X , with the latter representing exports from country i to country j by 
affiliates with country of UBO k.  Since the United States is involved in every trade observation, 
the trade distances (
ij dist1 ) are country specific for each of the other eight trade partners 
included, eliminating the need for country fixed effects.  Adding in a vector z to represent the 
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− ) 1 (ln ln .                    (3)  10
Vector z includes two different variables designed to capture average network effects and 
country-specific network variables to capture extraordinary network effects.  “HomeLink” is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the affiliates’ country of UBO matches the trade 
partner.  The coefficient reflects the tendency for the affiliate to trade with, either import from or 
export to, its home country.  The “dist2” variable measures the kilometer distance between the 
affiliates’ trade partner and their country of UBO.  If the trade partner matches the country of 
UBO, dist2 takes on the value of one to avoid taking the natural log of zero.  The HomeLink 
variable measures network effects in a discrete manner, while the dist2 variable measures it as a 
continuous variable.  The dist2 variable is particularly noteworthy because it represents a new 
way of measuring networks effects that is completely separate from any type of trade costs since 
the observations do not involve trade between the affiliates’ country of UBO and their trade 
partner.
5  An affiliate’s most direct business network may be its link with its parent company or 
group in its home country, measured by the HomeLink variable.  The affiliate may also be linked 
into the parent’s business network, which presumably is strongest in the vicinity of the parent 
company and grows weaker as one moves further away from the parent location (i.e., the 
affiliate’s country of UBO).  A negative and significant coefficient on the dist2 variable would 
reflect the affiliate’s tendency to trade less with buyers and sellers located farther away from its 
country of UBO.  
Table 9 shows the gravity equation estimates for U.S. bilateral trade with eight major 
trade partners in 1997, the most recent survey year available.  With eight countries of UBO and 
export and import data with eight trade partners, I have 128 potential observations for these 
regressions.  Some of these observations were dropped because the trade data were suppressed to 
avoid disclosing the information of individual companies.  In a few cases, observations where 
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bilateral trade was reported as zero were dropped to avoid taking the natural log of zero.  These 
data problems resulted in 118 observations for 1997, out of 128 potential observations.  Column 
(1) in Table 9 shows that after normalizing each bilateral trade flow by the trade partner’s 
income level, the trade distance (dist1) explains 95.8% of the remaining variation in the 
dependent variable.  The -0.944 estimated coefficient implies that a 10% increase in distance 
between the United States and the source or destination country results in 9.44% less trade. 
Adding the network variables further improves the fit of the gravity model, with  highly 
significant estimated coefficients of the expected sign on these variables, as shown in Columns 
(2)-(4) in Table 9.  Column (2) in Table 9 shows an estimated coefficient of 3.033 on the discrete 
HomeLink variable.  This means that after controlling for distance and income effects, affiliates 
trade a tremendous 20.8
6  times more with their home countries than with other countries.   
Measuring network effects with a continuous variable, dist2, produced a significant coefficient of 
–0.323, as shown in column (3).  In other words, a 10% increase in the distance between the 
affiliates’ home country and the trade partner implies 3.77% less trade.  To isolate the proximity 
effect from the home-link effect, the coefficient on dist2 is estimated again after dropping all 
observations of home-linked trade (i.e., where ln(dist2)=0).  As one might expect given the 
strength of the home bias in affiliates’ trade, the coefficient drops in both absolute value and 
significance.  The newly estimated coefficient on dist2 is -0.144.  The new estimate, however, 
reflects regional network effects that are completely separate from the home country trade bias of 
the affiliates.  A 10% increase in the distance between the affiliates’ home country and trade 
partner implies 1.44% less trade.  For example, this would imply that British affiliates in the 
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United States will trade 10.8% more with France than with Switzerland since France is 
approximately 75.1% closer to the United Kingdom than is Switzerland.
7  
The last column in Table 9 adds to the basic gravity equation a Japan-network dummy 
variable, along with the HomeLink variable described above.  The Japan-network dummy takes 
the value of one when trade involves Japanese affiliates exporting to Japan or importing from 
Japan.  The estimated coefficient on Japan-network just misses the 5% significance level (at 
5.2%), but is quite large.  Allowing for a slightly generous interpretation of significance, the 
Japan-network coefficient suggests that Japanese affiliates tend to trade with their home country 
much more than do the affiliates from other countries.  The positive, significant coefficient on 
the HomeLink variable can be interpreted as the average tendency among all affiliates to trade 
with their home countries.  Controlling for distance and incomes, affiliates on average traded 
16.14 times more with their home countries, while Japanese affiliates traded an additional 7.65 
times more with Japan in 1997.  Since these effects are multiplicative, Japanese affiliates traded 
123 (16.14*7.65) times more with Japan than would be predicted based on income and distance.  
This result supports the hypothesis that Japanese affiliates tend to have particularly strong 
network links with their home country.  The 1997 data also were used to check if adding a 
country-specific network dummy for any of the other seven countries of UBO would produce a 
significant coefficient, as in Japan’s case, but no other significant coefficients were found. 
Repeating the gravity estimates using 1987 and 1992 data produced very similar results 
to those reported in Table 9, so these results are not separately reported.  However, the one 
difference in results is that the Japan-network coefficient is significant at the 1% level for these 
years.  I pooled the data from all three years (n=333) and confirmed that there are no significant 
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time trends in the coefficients.  The results of the gravity model estimates with the pooled data 
are shown in Table X.  Almost all of the networks variables are significant at the 1% level and of 
the expected sign.  The results in column (2) show that affiliates on average traded 19.7 times 
more with their home countries than with other trade partners, controlling for income and 
distance effects.  Columns (3) and (4) show estimated coefficients on the dist2 parameter with 
and without the influence of the home-linked observations.  As expected, both the level of 
significance and the absolute value of the coefficient decline when the latter observations are 
dropped.  However, the result in column (4) implies that a 10% increase in distance from an 
affiliate’s home country means .84% less trade with that trade partner, having already controlled 
for trade distance and partner income. 
Columns (5) and (6) of Table X show the Japan-network effect.  On top of an average 
tendency by all affiliates to trade 14.4 times more with their home countries, Japanese affiliates 
traded an additional 9.86 time more with Japan, as shown in column (5).  In total, Japanese 
affiliates traded 142.4 times more with Japan than would be expected based on income and 
distance alone.  Using the pooled data, the seven other countries were tested for extraordinary 
network effects (i.e., beyond those captured by the HomeLink dummy variable).  Two countries 
had results significant at the 1% level, while the others had no significant results even at the 10% 
level.  The United Kingdom-network and Australia-network coefficients were estimated at 0.724 
and -2.584, on top of HomeLink estimates of 2.995 and 3.104, respectively.  This means that 
U.K. affiliates traded slightly more with the United Kingdom than the average affiliate home bias, 
while Australian affiliates traded substantially less with Australia than the average affiliate home 
bias.  Since these two countries’ affiliates, along with Japanese affiliates, deviated significantly 
in their home trade bias from the average, the last regression results in Table X report the gravity  14
model estimates when all three countries are included as country-specific network dummy 
variables along with the HomeLink dummy variable.  These results show that foreign affiliates 
from Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland tended to trade on average 17.5 
times more with their respective home countries than would be predicted by distance and income 
alone, while Australian affiliates traded only 1.5 (17.46*0.087) times more with Australia.   
Controlling for distance and income effects, affiliates from the United Kingdom traded 29.5 
(17.46*1.69) times more with the United Kingdom, while Japanese affiliates traded 129.7 
(17.46*7.43) times more with Japan. 
In sum, although the affiliates from all of the countries tended to trade more with their 
home countries than would be predicted by distance and income alone, the extremely strong 
tendency of Japanese affiliates to trade with Japan dwarfs the estimated network effects found 
for the other countries’ affiliates.  Japanese affiliates traded approximately 130 times more with 
Japan than expected, while most of the other countries’ affiliates traded only 17 times more with 
their home countries.  The only other affiliates with above average network strength were U.K. 
affiliates, which tended to trade with the United Kingdom about 30 times more than expected.  
These results support the conclusion that Japanese affiliates are distinctive in terms of the 
strength of their home trade bias. 
5.  Conclusions 
Descriptive statistics and gravity model evidence support the conclusion that network 
effects strongly influence the trade pattern of foreign affiliates in the United States.  Affiliates 
from all of the eight countries examined had much higher tendencies to trade with their home 
countries than did U.S. firms trade with those same countries.  The home country bias was 
particularly strong for importing by many of the countries’ affiliates.  Using gravity equations  15
with both discrete and continuous variables to measure network linkages between affiliates and 
their home countries, I obtain coefficients that are highly significant and of the expected sign.  
Affiliates have a tremendously higher tendency to engage in trade with their home countries than 
with other countries.  Controlling for distance, income and extraordinary home bias effects, 
affiliates on average tended to trade 17 times more with their home countries than with other 
countries, using the pooled data from 1987, 1992 and 1997.   
Using a continuous variable to measure network effects, I find that affiliates tend to trade 
less with countries that are located further from their home countries.  The distance between an 
affiliate’s home country and its trade partner is introduced as a new method of measuring 
network effects that is completely separate from transportation and other trade costs.  I find that a 
10% increase in this distance lowers trade by 3.05% when a country’s home trade bias is 
included or by 0.84% without this bias.  The latter effect measures the tendency of foreign 
affiliates in the United States to trade with partners located close to their home country, after 
controlling for income and trade distance effects. 
Both descriptive measures and gravity model estimates indicate that Japanese affiliates 
have an even higher tendency to trade with their home country than do the affiliates of the other 
seven countries.  Using pooled trade data for years 1987, 1992 and 1997, I find that Japanese 
affiliates traded a whopping 130 times more with Japan than would be predicted by income and 
distance effects alone, while foreign affiliates from five of the other seven industrialized 
countries traded on average only 17 times more with their respective home countries.  Affiliates 
from the United Kingdom were the only others to report a significant stronger-than-average 
home bias using the gravity model.  They traded 30 times more with the United Kingdom than 
would be predicted by distance and income alone.  Australian affiliates displayed a lower-than- 16
average tendency to trade with their home country, trading 1.5 times more than expected based 
on distance and income.  I find no evidence to support a conclusion that the strength of network 
effects or Japan-specific network effects has changed over time. 
Japanese affiliates in the United States are found to participate more in trade and to have 
stronger home bias in their trade pattern than do the other countries’ affiliates.  These results 
suggest that Japanese business networks have stronger impacts on U.S. trade than do the 
networks of other industrialized countries’ multinational firms.  Strong trade networks may 
enhance trade opportunities for network “insiders” but hinder them for “outsiders”.  This may 
lead to greater trade friction with countries that have stronger trade networks.  This hypothesis 
regarding the potential link between trade networks and trade policy is not analyzed in this study.  
However, the results regarding the distinctive strength of Japanese trade networks may help in 
explaining Noland’s (1997) finding that Japan is targeted disproportionately (after controlling for 
country size) in U.S. unilateral trade actions.    17
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of companies of
affiliates consoli- employees Total Gross Expendi- Sales Net Compen- U.S. U.S.
dated assets property, tures for income  sation of exports imports
plant, property, employees of goods of goods
and plant and shipped by shipped to
equipment equipment affiliates affiliates
All countries 8,110 22,937 3,224.30 943,654 353,278 45,657 744,617 7,820 96,009 48,091 143,537
Canada 1,047 3,609 592.9 142,506 74,118 9,324 89,433 2,052 16,356 4,963 8,033
Europe 4,235 12,764 1,940.40 475,413 196,200 20,538 393,132 5,189 58,046 18,357 51,065
France 413 1,123 187.8 34,675 19,849 1,613 44,113 -11 6,141 5,422 4,330
W. Germany 1,039 1,946 366.6 61,168 27,126 3,731 74,259 -87 11,169 3,636 17,264
Netherlands 274 1,474 270.1 68,929 47,993 4,472 52,373 1,218 6,991 1,485 4,268
Switzerland 587 1,318 191.6 75,036 14,297 1,469 38,704 507 6,437 1,937 4,269
UK 1,015 5,024 647.4 159,525 67,088 7,140 131,233 2,610 18,862 3,735 10,622
L. America+ 702 1,485 148.5 33,206 10,440 1,291 28,185 -388 3,841 1,761 5,461
Africa 60 184 22.6 8,847 8,086 526 6,244 286 883 497 811
Middle East 336 973 35.8 18,722 12,602 1,147 6,293 -828 987 253 342
Asia/Pacific 1,669 3,596 456 241,369 49,735 12,565 211,625 362 15,040 22,124 77,723
Australia 130 547 91.7 23,707 9,750 1,656 11,138 -46 2,368 210 504
Japan 1,159 2,355 303.2 200,386 32,950 9,587 186,812 401 11,098 20,413 72,564
Source:  BEA (1987), Table A-2
Notes:  "L. America+" refers to Latin America & Other Western Hemisphere
Selected financial and operating data of affiliates, by country of UBO, 1987
$millions
Table 1Number Number of Thousands
of companies of
affiliates consoli- employees Total Gross Expendi- Sales Net Gross Compen- U.S. U.S.
dated assets property, tures for income  product sation of exports imports
plant, property, employees of goods of goods
and plant and shipped by shipped to
equipment equipment affiliates affiliates
All countries 9,652 34,082 5,202 3,071,483 877,568 113,262 1,726,344 40,924 389,432 233,482 141,305 264,924
Canada 964 4,644 616 311,915 83,410 8,450 138,974 3,381 34,732 22,026 8,155 15,333
Europe 4,159 17,214 3,234 1,836,666 476,228 56,823 943,893 31,058 248,970 150,630 63,043 96,483
France 534 2,239 415 327,615 77,003 7,629 136,134 2,852 36,182 22,006 14,112 12,847
Germany 1,020 3,191 665 305,672 91,512 15,303 195,726 5,020 46,330 30,677 14,114 32,206
Netherlands 314 1,829 394 271,109 80,296 8,203 129,425 6,070 34,740 17,391 4,713 11,435
Switzerland 412 1,648 352 337,767 29,776 3,691 103,200 3,434 26,331 20,785 5,857 6,633
UK 946 5,890 981 462,654 148,864 16,015 256,693 11,536 78,289 43,024 14,461 15,309
L. America+ 631 1,693 169 60,506 28,470 2,616 54,260 2,420 13,682 6,603 5,297 9,910
Africa 40 164       22.6 11,931 9,504        (D) 11,192 348 2,870 1,342        (D) 545
Middle East 316 989       95.2 29,543 20,436 1,585 25,280 1,175 7,481 2,556 757 5,552
Asia/Pacific 3,438 8,739    1,013.9 692,399 236,107 38,501 529,294 -429 74,541 47,395 62,201 136,151
Australia 135 835       81.2 54,923 18,289 2,004 26,932 -1,214 5,488 3,676 1,235 1,137
Japan 2,628 6,241      812.3 587,197 187,559 31,571 450,976 2,561 63,017 39,090 52,524 120,693
Source:  BEA (1997), Table A-2
Notes:  "L. America+" refers to Latin America & Other Western Hemisphere
Selected financial and operating data of affiliates, by country of UBO, 1997
$millions
Table 2All Canada France Germany Nether- Switzer- UK Australia Japan
countries lands land
All industries 143,537 8,033 4,330 17,264 4,268 4,269 10,622 504 72,564
Petroleum 8,971 321 (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 0 (D)
   Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 5,964 0 (D) 0 (D) 0 (D) 0 0
   Other 3,006 321 (D) (D) (D) (D) 0 0 (D)
Manufacturing 24,546 4,274 1,773 4,312 1,443 1,632 3,339 304 4,195
   Chemicals and allied products 5,200 (D) 300 1,505 (D) 756 1,080 1 74
      Industrial chemicals and synthetics 3,468 (D) 31 1,432 86 (D) 662 0 56
   Primary and fabricated metals 3,680 1,243 85 551 7 168 355 (D) 334
   Machinery 7,634 556 331 1,356 (D) 355 356 2 2,253
      Machinery, except electrical 2,876 (D) (D) 526 34 (D) 197 2 711
      Electric and electronic equipment 4,758 (D) (D) 829 (D) (D) 159 (*) 1,542
   Other manufacturing 6,391 (D) 979 (D) 26 237 1,010 (D) 1,503
Wholesale trade 107,278 2,907 2,394 12,346 343 1,646 4,650 (D) 68,166
   Motor vehicles and equipment 50,040 (D) (D) 9,312 3 (D) 395 0 33,018
   Professional & commercial equip. & supplies 6,581 126 3 649 (D) 120 23 0 5,481
   Metals and minerals, except petroleum 15,382 685 418 936 (D) (D) 242 (D) 10,782
   Electrical goods 15,140 (D) 25 76 (D) 60 93 0 13,388
   Machinery, equipment, and supplies  4,770 (D) 45 774 18 564 212 0 2,136
   Other durable goods 3,024 105 117 95 24 310 247 (*) 1,511
   Groceries and related products 3,637 (D) (D) 25 0 (D) 1,004 0 246
   Other nondurable goods 6,170 1,484 459 (D) 41 (D) 1,531 (D) (D)
Source:  BEA (1987), Table G-6
Note:  Industries that contributed less than 2% to total exports shipped by all countries' affiliates (i.e., less than $2,871 million) were dropped from the table 
for the sake of brevity.  An asterick "(*)" indicates a value between 0 and $500,000; a "(D)" indicates that the data have been suppressed to avoid the disclosure 
of data of individual companies. 
Table 3
U.S. imports of goods shipped to affiliates, industry of affiliate by country of UBO, 1987 ($millions)All Canada France Germany Nether- Switzer- UK Australia Japan
countries lands land
All industries  264,924 15,333 12,847 32,206 11,435 6,633 15,309 1,137 120,693
Manufacturing 105,242 7,027 8,646 12,572 7,628 3,309 11,169 582 37,528
    Petroleum and coal products  10,882     (D) 3 2     (D) 0      (D) 0     (*)
    Chemicals   16,257 588 1,308 4,777 842 2,112 4,707     (D) 783
        Pharmaceuticals and medicines  7,710     (D) 417      (D) 7     (D)      (D)     (D) 129
    Primary and fabricated metals  9,189 1,951 578 562 89 84 423     (D) 1,517
        Primary metals  6,393     (D) 425 328     (D) 73 155     (D) 980
    Machinery  6,974 70 24 2,104 103 367 261 77 2,464
    Computers and electronic products  27,750     (D)     (D) 280     (D) 154 885 9 15,038
        Communications equipment  6,751     (D)     (D)      (D) 0     (D)      (D) 8 3,460
        Semiconductors & other electronic components  6,057     (D)     (D) 190     (D) 9 662     (*) 1,236
    Transportation equipment  18,430 190 563 2,293     (D) 2 466 2 14,438
       Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts  17,730 190     (D)      (D)     (D) 0 304 2 14,399
Wholesale trade  151,005 6,024 3,446 18,167 2,980 3,283 3,812     (D) 82,349
    Motor vehicles & motor vehicle parts & supplies  49,781     (D) 3 13,484     (D)     (*) 24     (D) 29,871
    Professional & commercial equipment  and supplie 15,324     (D)     (D) 357     (D) 178 88 3 10,921
    Electrical goods  25,580     (D) 257 223 204 66 187 5 18,875
    Other durable goods  28,652 2,731 1,307 2,095 552 1,453 834 28 12,696
    Petroleum and petroleum products  7,196 1 1 1     (D)     (D)      (D) 1     (D)
    Other nondurable goods  24,472 1,362     (D) 2,007 845     (D)      (D)     (D)     (D)
Source:  BEA (1997), Table H-6
Note:  Industries that contributed less than 2% to total exports shipped by all countries' affiliates (i.e., less than $5298 million) were dropped from the table 
for the sake of brevity.  An asterick "(*)" indicates a value between 0 and $500,000; a "(D)" indicates that the data have been suppressed to avoid the disclosure 
of data of individual companies. 
Table 4
U.S. imports of goods shipped to affiliates, industry of affiliate by country of UBO, 1997 ($millions)All Canada France Germany Nether- Switzer- UK Australia Japan
countries lands land
All industries 48,091 4,963 5,422 3,636 1,485 1,937 3,735 210 20,413
Petroleum 1,186 3 (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 2 (D)
Manufacturing 15,487 4,042 937 2,798 707 770 2,631 107 1,126
   Chemicals and allied products 6,849 (D) 181 1,376 149 450 750 (*) 235
      Industrial chemicals and synthetics 5,654 (D) (D) 1,280 (D) (D) 675 0 93
   Primary and fabricated metals 1,509 282 42 178 3 34 233 (D) 28
      Primary metal industries 1,085 (D) (D) (D) 1 (D) 210 (D) 26
      Nonferrous 980 (D) (D) 18 0 (D) 205 (D) 18
   Machinery 3,439 169 251 890 (D) 100 582 7 313
      Machinery, except electrical 1,391 19 231 (D) 30 (D) 284 (D) 211
      Electric and electronic equipment 2,048 151 19 (D) (D) (D) 299 (D) 102
   Other manufacturing 3,173 (D) 455 352 (D) 117 973 (D) 393
Wholesale trade 29,165 459 4,249 536 332 1,068 659 47 19,203
   Motor vehicles and equipment 3,111 (D) (D) 1891020 ( D )
   Metals and minerals, except petroleum 11,007 72 (D) 192 (D) (D) (D) (*) 10,213
   Machinery, equipment, and supplies  1,058 64 15 43 (*) 32 60 (D) 379
   Groceries and related products 1,418 (D) (*) 9 1 (D) 309 0 656
   Farm-product raw materials  9,753 (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 0 0 4,150
   Other nondurable goods 1,200 (D) 25 (D) 32 1 204 (D) (D)
Other industries 1,075 448 (D) (D) (D) 19 (D) 53 (D)
Source:  BEA (1987), Table G-3
Note:  Industries that contributed less than 2% to total exports shipped by all countries' affiliates (i.e., less than $962 million) were dropped from the table 
for the sake of brevity.  An asterick "(*)" indicates a value between 0 and $500,000; a "(D)" indicates that the data have been suppressed to avoid the disclosure 
of data of individual companies. 
Table 5
U.S. exports of goods shipped by affiliates, industry of affiliate by country of UBO, 1987 ($millions)All Canada France Germany Nether- Switzer- UK Australia Japan
countries lands land
All industries 141,305 8,155 14,112 14,114 4,713 5,857 14,461 1,235 52,524
Manufacturing 71,251 4,585 7,210 10,633 4,278 4,815 11,999 749 16,513
    Food  2,846 95 68 19 43      (D) 696 15 965
    Chemicals   15,443 435 1,375 4,585 1,309 1,479 2,589      (D) 1,879
        Basic chemicals  4,911      (D) 848 1,306      (D) 198 626      (D) 678
        Pharmaceuticals and medicines  4,002      (D) 273      (D) 6 1,149 494 0 214
    Primary and fabricated metals  5,236 924 408 355 21 167 488      (D) 838
        Primary metals  3,183      (D)      (D) 186      (D) 154 66      (D) 602
    Machinery  8,698 120 51 1,702 104 1,747 1,222 123 1,612
    Computers and electronic products  14,238      (D)      (D) 211      (D) 533 960 4 4,834
        Communications equipment  4,570      (D)      (D)      (D) 0      (D)       (D) 1 1,150
        Semiconductors and other electronic components  2,848 24 86 70      (D) 5 460      (*) 909
    Electrical equipment, appliances, and components  4,664 8      (D)      (D)      (D) 17       (D)      (D) 271
    Transportation equipment  7,930 212 766 1,148      (D) 2 1,054      (*) 4,317
       Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts  6,881 211      (D)      (D)      (D) 0 431      (*) 4,292
Wholesale trade  62,222 1,822 5,902 2,517 418 925 1,011 234 35,052
    Motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and supplies  4,816      (D) 1      (D) 1      (*) 39 2 3,336
    Electrical goods  4,924      (D) 40 51 23 4 76 2 2,713
    Other durable goods  14,684 422 309 929 158 162 450      (D) 6,856
    Petroleum and petroleum products  5,902      (D)      (D)      (*)      (D)      (D) 3      (*)      (D)
    Other nondurable goods  29,843 597      (D)      (D) 87      (D) 429      (D)      (D)
Other industries  4,623      (D)      (D)      (D) 0      (D)       (D)      (D) 92
    Mining  3,859 1,541      (D)      (D) 0      (D) 901      (D)      (D)
Source:  BEA (1997), Table H-3
Note:  Industries that contributed less than 2% to total exports shipped by all countries' affiliates (i.e., less than $2,826 million) were dropped from the table 
for the sake of brevity.  An asterick "(*)" indicates a value between 0 and $500,000; a "(D)" indicates that the data have been suppressed to avoid the disclosure 
of data of individual companies. 
Table 6
$millions
US exports of goods shipped by affiliates, industry of affiliate by country of UBO, 1997Total Affiliate US firm Affiliate Total Affiliate US firm Affiliate
Source Destination trade trade trade share trade trade trade share
US Canada 69,890 4,169 65,721 0.0597 146,853 22,519 124,334 0.1533
US France 10,008 826 9,182 0.0825 20,527 3,082 17,445 0.1501
US Germany 13,247 2,164 11,083 0.1634 28,421 6,384 22,037 0.2246
US Netherlands 7,206 1,181 6,025 0.1639 16,211 3,269 12,942 0.2017
US Switzerland 2,887 617 2,270 0.2137 8,793 2,529 6,264 0.2876
US UK 15,338 2,568 319 0.1674 39,508 6,181 2,612 0.1564
US Australia 4,844 472 4,372 0.0974 12,924 1,709 11,215 0.1322
US Japan 30,820 18,983 11,837 0.6159 70,749 33,549 37,200 0.4742
US 8-country sum 154,241 30,980 123,261 0.2009 343,986 79,222 264,764 0.2303
US All 275,656 48,091 227,565 0.1745 735,357 141,305 594,052 0.1922
Canada US 77,020 7,952 69,068 0.1032 185,676 25,475 160,201 0.1372
France US 10,828 3,189 7,639 0.2945 19,529 6,921 12,608 0.3544
Germany US 27,648 16,372 11,276 0.5922 45,379 23,868 21,511 0.5260
Netherlands US 4,480 1,173 3,307 0.2619 7,430 2,783 4,647 0.3746
Switzerland US 4,133 2,421 1,712 0.5857 8,278 5,181 3,097 0.6259
UK US 18,060 4,754 13,306 0.2632 35,792 11,018 24,774 0.3078
Australia US 3,200 849 2,351 0.2653 4,665 738 3,927 0.1582
Japan US 88,573 69,266 19,307 0.7820 121,274 100,236 21,038 0.8265
8-country sum US 233,942 105,976 127,966 0.4530 428,023 176,220 251,803 0.4117
All US 416,975 143,537 273,438 0.3442 894,063 264,924 629,139 0.2963
Sources:  BEA (1987) Tables G-24, G-30 and BEA (1997) Tables H-24, H-30 for affiliate trade data; World Trade Analyzer, Statistics Canada (1997)
 for bilateral trade data.
 
Table 7
Foreign affiliates' role in US bilateral trade, 1987 and 1997
($millions)
1987 19971987 1997 1987 1997 1987 1997 1987 1997 1987 1997 1987 1997 1987 1997 1987 1997
Country of UBO
All countries 39.74 44.60 75.38 76.38
Canada 2.18 2.91 7.66 7.07 30.67 52.34 73.42 85.59 1.06 2.50 2.91 3.36 17.69 36.70 71.17 85.38
Europe 9.58 13.11 36.07 35.28 39.25 34.89 69.73 65.45 1.39 1.51 3.15 3.69 30.16 32.24 71.90 70.98
France 3.48 7.37 22.27 25.68 6.42 10.72 55.70 39.04 1.59 3.65 19.94 19.48 17.23 20.97 75.38 54.39
Germany* 8.30 11.01 51.50 46.97 30.23 22.18 82.48 66.18 6.21 5.98 20.00 19.36 37.98 37.29 86.88 80.71
Netherlands 4.07 3.26 15.78 29.49 19.73 11.20 16.57 19.16 7.45 5.14 13.70 25.94 50.24 48.86 39.53 56.95
Switzerland 10.19 13.65 44.15 44.18 15.18 20.49 42.75 55.13 15.22 19.43 68.27 112.00 30.46 40.07 76.32 80.93
UK 4.80 5.94 19.41 17.84 19.73 16.22 33.01 41.71 3.52 2.89 6.78 10.59 30.12 23.57 46.88 60.83
Latin America 0.75 1.39 8.93 5.18 13.52 40.46 64.42 74.59 1.07 1.75 5.67 3.94 23.57 34.25 60.45 69.82
Africa 0.70 (D) 3.27 1.15 8.45 (D) 46.12 37.25 3.65 (D) 15.45 15.57 8.25 (D) 40.44 43.12
Middle East 1.56 1.15 1.97 20.71 59.68 40.03 71.35 82.26 15.16 9.56 16.80 30.22 54.15 46.76 78.36 81.83
Asia/Pacific 25.04 18.14 42.41 35.84 85.45 65.05 96.85 89.98 3.91 2.35 2.75 2.74 54.67 59.87 79.52 79.52
Australia 0.52 1.80 4.53 7.07 11.90 18.79 28.77 29.02 6.20 9.95 33.46 46.50 13.33 19.68 39.68 48.28
Japan 51.18 38.48 76.30 80.73 77.27 51.83 93.13 81.11 14.85 8.28 13.19 24.26 53.23 60.62 79.04 79.72
Source:  Author's calculations based on BEA (1987), Tables G24, G26, G30, & G32; BEA (1997), Tables H24, H26, H30 & H32; 
and World Trade Analyzer data.
*West Germany in 1987
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export bias (%)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Dist1) -0.944** -0.991** -0.687** -0.859** -0.991**












Adj. R sq. 0.958 0.973 0.972 0.974 0.973
observations 118 118 118 102 118
Notes:  Dist1 = distance between source and destination countries of trade;
Dist2 = distance between non-US source or destination country and affiliates' country of UBO;
HomeLink = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the trade is between foreign affiliates and
                        their home country;
Japan-network = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if trade is between Japanese affiliates and
                   Japan;
^ indicates significance at the 10% level;
* indicates significance at the 5% level;
** indicates significance at the 1% level;
Standard errors shown in parentheses; exponent of coefficient shown in brackets.
Independent
variables:
Gravity model results on foreign affiliates' trade by country of UBO with 8 major trade partners, 1997
Table 9(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Dist1) -0.956** -1.005** -0.718** -0.930** -1.006** -0.992**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.021) (0.043) (0.009) (0.008)

















Adj. R sq. 0.959 0.974 0.973 0.976 0.975 0.983
observations 333 333 333 285 333 333
Notes:  Dist1 = distance between source and destination countries of trade;
Dist2 = distance between non-US source or destination country and affiliates' country of UBO
HomeLink = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the trade is between foreign affiliates and
                        their home country;
Japan-network = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if trade is between Japanese affiliates and
                   Japan; UK-network and Australia-network variables are defined similarly;
^ indicates significance at the 10% level;
* indicates significance at the 5% level;
** indicates significance at the 1% level;




Gravity model results on foreign affiliates' trade by country of UBO with 8 major trade partners,
pooled data for years 1987, 1992, 1997